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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Frontiero v. Richardson,
Uniform Services Fringe Benefit Statute which
Presumes Spouses of Male Members to be Dependent,
but Requires Spouses of Female Members to be
Dependent in Fact, is Violative of Due Process
Sharron Frontiero, a married air force servicewoman, applied for an
increase in quarters allowance and for medical and dental benefits for
her husband, Joseph, pursuant to statutory regulation.' Lt. Frontiero's
request was denied on the basis that she failed to prove that her husband was dependent upon her for more than half of his support. Under the applicable statutes, the dependency of a serviceman's wife is
presumed by definition, but a married servicewoman must demonstrate her spouse's financial need in order to receive dependent's benefits. 2 At the time his wife applied for benefits, Joseph Frontiero was a
full-time college student. His expenses were approximately $354.00
per month and he was receiving approximately $205.00 per month in
veteran's benefits.' Lt. Frontiero brought suit seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief and back pay, claiming that the dependency classifications operated to deny due process under the fifth amendment to
married women in the military since they differentiated between similarly situated members of the uniformed services on the basis of sex.'
The three-judge district court determined that the statutory classifications pertaining to dependents were not based solely on sex, but were
also based on the nature of the relationship between the service
member and his dependent.' The court concluded that the classifications were rationally related to the legislative purpose involved, admin1. 37 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403, 10 U.S.C. § 1072, 1076 (1964); 10 U.S.C. § 1072(c)
"Dependent", with respect to a member of a uniformed service means-

(A) the wife; . . .
(C) the husband, if he is in fact dependent on the member or former member
or for over one-half of his support.
37 U.S.C. § 401 Definitions.
In this chapter, "dependent", with respect to a member of a uniformed service, means(1) his spouse; . .
a
However, a person is not a dependent of a female member unless he is in
fact dependent on her for over one-half of his support.
2. 37 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403; 10 U.S.C. §§ 1072, 1076 (1964).
3. Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F. Supp. 201, 204 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
4. Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F. Supp. 201 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
See generally,
Brown, Emerson, Falk, and Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights For Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 967-80 (1971), for
a summary of women's rights in the military and Note, The Equal Rights Amendment and the Military, 82 YALE L.J. 1533 (1973), which proposes the changes in

the military which the Equal Rights Amendment would effect.
5. 341 F. Supp. at 205-06.
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istrative convenience and economy of public funds.6 Although the
court recognized that as a consequence of the statute married women
were burdened in qualifying for dependent's benefits where married
men were not, it felt that the resulting inequity was not invidious dis7
crimination.
On direct appeal the United States Supreme Court reversed the lower
court in an eight-to-one decision." The judgment of the Court was
announced by Justice Brennan. Although eight members of the Court
concurred in the judgment, the three supporting opinions showed a distinct and decisive split in the formulation of the equal protection rationale which supported their conclusions. Justice Brennan, in an
opinion joined by Justices Douglas, White, and Marshall, concluded
that statutory classifications based solely upon sex are inherently suspect and therefore require strict scrutiny on review by the courts.'
Justice Powell, in a brief opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Blackmun, expressly refused to characterize classification based
on sex as inherently suspect; however, he determined that the statutes violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment because
they invidiously discriminated against women. 10 Justice Stewart summarily stated in a one sentence concurrence that the statutes were unconstitutional since they invidiously discriminate."
Thus, the eight
concurring Justices disagreed as to the proper standard of review to
be applied to the equal protection claim.
The Frontiero case represented the second time in which the Supreme Court has applied the equal protection clause to sustain a claim
against laws with sex-based classifications. 1 2 The two major areas of
significance in the resolution of the case were the extent to which Frontiero represented a change in judicial attitudes toward sex as a rational basis for classification and the Burger Court's evaluation of its
equal protection policy. This comment will examine the Court's
analysis in Frontiero in order to determine what standard of review
the Court is formulating in an area of increasing social and political importance-legislative discrimination on the basis of sex.
6. Id. at 207.
7. Id. at 207-08.
8. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
Only Justice Rehnquist dissented for reasons stated in the district court opinion.
9. Id. at 688 (Brennan, J., announcing the Court's judgment and an opinion in
which Douglas, White, and Marshall, JJ., joined).
10. Id. at 691-92 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).
11. Id. at 691 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment).
12. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), was the first case in which the Supreme
Court found a classification based on sex discriminatory.
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EQUAL PROTECTION

In order to discuss the significance of the Court's analysis in Frontiero, it is appropriate to review the background of past Court formulations in the equal protection area. The equal protection claim in
Frontiero was based on the due process clause of the fifth amendment. The equal protection clause pertaining to the states in the fourteenth amendment has no explicit counterpart applicable to federal
laws; but the due process clause of the fifth amendment has been construed to contain a comparable guarantee of "fairness" which precludes invidious discrimination.' 3 In 1954, the Court stated:
The "equal protection of the laws" is a more explicit safeguard of
prohibited unfairness than "due process of law", and, therefore,
we do not imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases.
But, as this Court has recognized, discrimination
may be so un4
justifiable as to be violative of due process.'
The Court, in the past as in Frontiero, has used an equal protection analysis to resolve fifth amendment due process claims.' 5 The Court's
approach is to analyze the legislature's classification in the law to determine whether or not it affords "equal protection under the laws."
By allowing legislative bodies to make statutory classifications, the
Court permits inequalities to exist, since classifications by their nature
create disparate treatment. However, the Court does require that the
classification be reasonable.'6
The test traditionally applied in reviewing social and economic equal
protection claims' 7 is that the classification be reasonable, not arbitrary, 18 and have a rational relationship to the legislature's objectives. " "A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of
facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it."'" The Court presumes
that the legislature has acted constitutionally unless it can perceive that
the classification is unrelated to the purpose of the law. 2 '
13. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954), which forbade racial discrimination in public schools by the federal government, was a companion case to Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
14. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
15. Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971).
16. See Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL.
L. REv. 341 (1949); and Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L.
REV. 1065 (1969), for studies of the equal protection doctrine.
17. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
18. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
19. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308 (1966) (citations omitted).
20. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
21. Id. at 425; see generally, Legislative Purpose, Rationality and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972), for discussion of how the Court has used the rationality test as a diversionary technique to obscure policy issues.
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In addition to the traditional test, which requires minimum scrutiny
of the challenged legislation, the Warren Court developed a new equal
protection standard invoked where a fundamental right 22 or suspect

classification 23 was involved.

This test required the Court to invali-

date the classification unless it was necessary to promote a permissible,
compelling state interest.2 4 This standard was developed in recognition
that there are certain rights which the Court must protect with special
care from legislative interference.
In effect, when the Warren Court
applied the traditional standard, it was willing to permit any possible
rationale to uphold a statute.2 8 But when the Court found a fundamental right or suspect classification, the classification invariably was
struck down, since the legislature's justification was inadequate to meet
the more stringent standard. 27 Under this two-tier process of review
by the Warren Court, the choice of the standard used to review a case
often determined the outcome.28
WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND THE COURT

The Supreme Court's past refusal to apply existing due process and
equal protection guarantees to women has generated a movement for an
Equal Rights Amendment. 29 Early Supreme Court decisions showed a

biased judicial attitude toward women which hindered the attainment
of equal rights under the law. In an 1872 case, Bradwell v. Illinois,3 °
the Court upheld the state's exclusion of women from admission to the
bar. In a concurring opinion Justice Bradley espoused a weaker-sex
22. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right of interstate travel).
23. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (nationality);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)
(alienage); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967) (race).
24. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 192-94 (1964).
25. Such preferential treatment was suggested by Justice Stone in his famous footnote in U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
Justice Harlan
criticized what he considered a subjective judicial approach by the Court in Katzenbach
v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 660-61 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1125-26 (1969).
26. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
27. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Gunther,
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972) [herein cited as Gunther].
28. Comment, Are Sex-based Classifications Constitutionally Suspect?, 66 Nw. U.L.
REV. 481, 485 (1971); see also Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82
HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1076-78, 1087 (1969), for discussion of standards of review.
29. "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex."
S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1971).
See Martin, Equal Rights Amendment: Legislative Background, 11
J. FAM. L. 363, 363 (1972), which noted that an equal rights provision has been
introduced into every Congress since 1923.
30. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
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philosophy giving the state the right to protect women from occupations for which they are unsuited, as well as protecting society's interest
in family life." In Minor v. Happerselt,32 the Court refused to construe the privileges and immunities clause to give women the right to
vote as citizens, which led eventually to the passage of the nineteenth
amendment. In Muller v. Oregon3 3 the Court upheld a state law limiting the hours of employment of women three years after it invalidated a
similar law which applied to both male and female workers.8 4 The
Court concluded that the inferior physical strength of women justified
placing them in a class by themselves: 5
.. . [H]istory discloses the fact that woman has always been
dependent upon man. .

.

. As minors, though not to the same

extent, she has been looked upon in the courts as needing especial
care that her rights may be preserved. Education was long denied
her, and while now the doors of the school room are opened and
her opportunities for acquiring knowledge are great, yet even with
that and the consequent increase of capacity for business affairs
it is still true that in the struggle for subsistence she is not an
equal competitor with her brother. Though limitations upon personal and contractual rights may be removed by legislation, there
is that in her disposition and habits
of life which will operate
36
against a full assertion of those rights.
The language of the Court in Muller has been used to uphold a wide
range of laws which differentiate on the basis of sex.3 7
As late as 1961, the Court was willing to uphold a state statute automatically relieving women from jury duty under the justification that
the "woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life...
with her own special responsibilities." 38 Despite the new equal protection policies, no effort was made to bring classifications based on
sex within the purview of strict judicial scrutiny. 9
Reed: A NEW DIRECTION
The Court first departed from its past position on women's rights in
31. Id. at 141-42 (Bradley, I., concurring).
32. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
33. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
34. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
35. 208 U.S. at 422.
36. Id. at 421-22.
37. In Murray and Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and
Title VII, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 232, 237 (1965), the language in Muller v.
Oregon has been cited as support for excluding women from juries, giving them
different licensing treatment, and excluding them from state-supported colleges.
38. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961).
39. In Williams v. McNair, 401 U.S. 951 (1971), the Court affirmed without
opinion the lower court decision, 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970) upholding the
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1971, in Reed v. Reed,4" when it invalidated a state law through equal
protection principles. In Reed the Burger Court unanimously agreed
that the classification contained in Idaho Code § 15-314 was unconstitutional: the statutory provision gave compulsory preference to men
over women when both were equally entitled to be appointed the
administrator of a decedent's estate.4 1 The Idaho Supreme Court, applying the traditional equal protection test of minimum scrutiny, upheld
the statute. It found that the classification based on sex was reasonably related to the legislative purpose: to expedite administration of
estates. 42 The court concluded that the classification was reasonable
since most men in the community have more business experience
than women and consequently are better qualified to be administrators.4 3

Similarly, the United States Supreme Court purported to resolve
whether the classification based solely on sex "bears a rational relationship to a state objective that is sought to be advanced by the operation"
of the statute under question.44 The Court acknowledged the legitimacy
of reducing the number of people competing to receive letters of administration within the same entitlement class, but it nevertheless did not
45
find the classification permissible.
To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over
members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of
hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment; and whatever may be said as to the positive values of avoiding intrafamily controversy, the choice in this
context may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex. 48
The Court did not discuss whether or not men as a class are more
qualified in business affairs than women, although it did take judicial
notice that a large number of women, mainly surviving widows, administer estates in this country.4 7
The Reed decision indicated a subtle change in the Court's attitude
and examination of sex-based classifications. The Court purported to
use a traditional minimal scrutiny standard of review. Under that
exclusion of men from a state-supported college.

The federal district court found

reasonable the legislature's determination that sexually segregated schools have educational merit.
40. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
41. Id. at 73.
42. Reed v. Reed, 93 Idaho 511, 465 P.2d 635 (1970).
43. Id. at 514, 465 P.2d at 638.
44. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
45. Id. at 76.
46. Id. at 76-77.
47. Id. at 75.
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standard it could have found that the classification was rational in itself and reasonably related to a permissible state objective. However, its conclusion could not be reached without applying a standard
of greater scrutiny. The decision was devoid of any explanation of how
the Court reached its incongruous result. The Court not only failed
to refute the weaker-sex philosophy of past decisions, but it also neglected to discuss sex as a basis for classification. The Court merely
found that the classification was "arbitrary." As a result of the Court's
failure to explain its reasoning, the utility of the Reed decision in producing a change in judicial policy in sex discrimination cases was severely
limited.4 8 Thus, the Burger Court's decision in Reed v. Reed was an
unsatisfactory attempt to articulate a change in the Court's equal protection policy in the area of sex-based classifications in the law.
AFTER

Reed

Predictably Reed engendered confusion among the lower courts as
to what standard of review it demanded.4 9 Three views emerged from
the lower courts in subsequent cases; some courts followed the traditional rational basis test and others, the compelling state interest test.
However, a third group of courts interpreted Reed to set forth a new
intermediate test which applied a degree of judicial scrutiny between
that demanded by the other two tests.
The courts which cited Reed as expounding the traditional minimum scrutiny test saw no change in the Supreme Court's standard of
review. In Schattman v. Texas Employment Commission,50 the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court to hold that a
compulsory maternity leave which required termination of employment two months prior to delivery was reasonably and rationally related
to a permissible state purpose. The court felt that the statute was reasonable since it terminated employment only because the pregnancy
was far advanced. The court rejected the claim that pregnancies
should be treated on an individual basis like any other medical incapacity:
Is it conducive to the reasonably efficient operation of a state
agency that it should involve itself in strife, discord, unhappiness,
48. Getman, The Emerging Constitutional Principle of Sexual Equality, 1972 SUP.
CT. Rav. 157, 163-64.
49. Id. at 163.
50. 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1107 (1973).
But cf.
Struck v. Secretary of Defense, 460 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 1972), where a pregnant
air force officer was discharged because of her pregnancy, vacated and remanded
for mootness, 409 U.S. 1071 (1972).

Loyola University Law Journal

Vol. 5: 295

jealousies, and recriminations caused by allowing one woman to
work through the eighth or ninth month of pregnancy as a matter of opinion on the part of some supervisor while requiring another to stop at the end of the seventh? 51
In Bucha v. Illinois High School Association,5 2 the federal district court
for the Northern District of Illinois considered the physical and psychological differences between male and female athletes to be a reasonable
basis for prohibiting interscholastic competition between high school
boys and girls and for imposing certain restrictions on girl's athletic
contests. In Robinson v. Board of Regents of Eastern Kentucky University,5" the Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit upheld restrictions
applicable only to women college students, finding that under the traditional standard as applied in Reed, the state's assertion that "women
are more likely to be criminally attacked later at night and are physically
less capable of defending themselves than men" justified the differentiation based on sex. In all of these cases, the courts used the rational
basis test as set forth in Reed to deny relief under the equal protection
claim.
A number of lower courts concluded that the Supreme Court was
devising a new intermediate test which applied a degree of judicial
scrutiny between that of the traditional rational basis test and the
compelling state interest test. These courts decided that Reed required a "fair and substantial relation" to the legislative purpose rather
than a mere reasonable relation.
In Green v. Waterford Board of Education," the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit reversed the lower court and held that a regulation requiring a teacher to cease employment when six months pregnant
was arbitrary and discriminatory. The court found that the "definition of what constitutes the necessary rational relationship between a
classification and a legitimate governmental interest seems to have
become slightly, but perceptibly, more rigorous." 55 Accordingly, the
court evaluated the state's concern with the health and safety of the unborn child and with the classroom distractions caused by a pregnant
teacher and decided that they were not a reasonable basis for the regu51. 459 F.2d at 39.
52. 351 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill. 1972). The restrictions on girls' contests included
a prohibition on cheerleading, a one dollar limitation on rewards, and prohibition
of overnight trips to participate in athletic contests.
53. 475 F.2d 707, 711 (6th Cir. 1973), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3080
(U.S. Aug. 14, 1973); see Archer v. Mayer, 213 Va. 633, 194 S.E.2d 707 (1973),
which upheld a statute allowing women to claim an automatic exemption from jury
duty because of women's special role in family life.
54. 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973).
55. Id. at 633.
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lation. It concluded that the state's interest in the continuity of classroom education and administrative convenience were not substantial
enough to uphold the requirement under the new Reed standard. In
Heath v. Westerville Board of Education,5" again involving a regulation
pertaining to employment of a pregnant teacher, the federal district
court for the Southern District of Ohio applied an intermediate analysis
in holding the regulation to violate equal protection. The court stated:
"Sexual stereotypes are no less invidious than racial or religious ones."5' 7
It felt that the Board of Education's failure to treat pregnant women
as individuals was "dehumanizing.""8 However, the court explicitly refused to decide whether a stricter standard applied in this area since
the Board of Education failed to produce any reasonable justification.
In Eslinger v. Thomas,"9 a female law student was denied a job as a
page in the South Carolina state senate on the ground that the duties
involved might lead to an "appearance of the impropriety" between a
male elected official and a female page. The court found that this
justification was not sufficient since the classification was held to have
less than a "fair and substantial relationship" between the purposes of
the resolution and its justification. The new standard held that "[a]
classification based upon sex is less than suspect; a validating relationship must be more than minimal.""0
A third interpretation of Reed suggested that the compelling state
interest test should be applied. On a motion to dismiss and for summary judgment, the federal district court for the Southern District of
New York said, in Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of
New York, "Sex legislation is. . . automatically suspect." 6' 1
THE SPLIT IN FRONTIERO

In the midst of this confusion, it was not surprising that the Court in
Frontiero attempted to clarify what it said in Reed.62 Significantly,
56. 345 F. Supp. 501 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
57. Id. at 505.
58. Id. at 505; cf. La Fleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Education, 465 F.2d 1184 (1972),
alf'd, 42 U.S.L.W. 4186, (U.S. Jan. 22, 1974), which held a substantially similar regulation applying to pregnant teachers arbitrary and unreasonably overbroad. The court

rejected continuity of classroom instruction and relief of administrative problems as
reasonable objectives of the regulation.
59. 476 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1973).

60.

Id. at 231.

61. 357 F. Supp. 1051, 1053 (S.D. N.Y. 1972), cf. Green v. Bd. of Regents of
Texas Tech Univ., 335 F. Supp. 249, 250 (N.D. Tex. 1971) (dictum): "The Supreme

Court has made it quite clear that discrimination [by any state law or authority] on
the basis of sex is not to be tolerated."
62.

The Court had passed up several other chances to expound its views on sex-

based classifications.

In Forbush v. Wallace, 405 U.S. 970 (1972), the Court affirmed
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three opinions supporting the judgment in Frontiero all find support
for their rationale in the unanimous Reed opinion despite their differing
conclusions as to what standard of review should be applied. Justice
Brennan found implicit support in Reed for his conclusion that Reed
rejected a traditional equal protection approach by its analysis.6 3 Justice Brennan pointed out that the Court, by its conclusion in Reed
that the classification was arbitrary, rejected the assumption made by
the Idaho Supreme Court that the classification was reasonable since
men are better qualified in business affairs than women. Justice
Brennan's discussion of the lack of appropriateness of sex as a basis
for classification is a departure from the Court's past weaker-sex
philosophy. His rationale as well as his conclusion that classifications
based on sex are inherently suspect is in contrast with the Court's
silence in Reed but is not inconsistent with it.
Justice Powell refused to explain his views as to whether or not sex
is an inherently suspect classification and preferred instead to decide the
case on the authority of Reed.64 Justice Stewart also cited Reed as
the authority for his conclusion that the statute unconstitutionally discriminates. 65 Justices Powell and Stewart's opinions are troublesome:
their unexplained conclusions in Frontiero, like the wording of the decision in Reed, indicate that no change in the Court's perception of sex
classifications in equal protection claims had occurred.
That Justice Brennan looked for support to the Court's conclusion in Reed, while Justices Stewart and Powell also found support
on the face of the opinion, emphasizes the difficulty which Reed
introduced in signifying the Court's change in policy.
To further justify his unprecedented views that sex-based classifications are inherently suspect, Justice Brennan capsulized the history of
paternalistic attitudes toward women which resulted in the stereotypes
upon which sex discrimination is founded.6 6 By characterizing sex as a
highly visible trait which has no relation to one's ability to function in
society, Justice Brennan argued that sex is similar to race and national
without opinion a statute requiring a married woman to use her husband's surname
on her driver's license. In Pacheco v. Pacheco, 404 U.S. 804 (1971), the Court
found no substantial federal question in a challenge of a law barring alimony to
adulterous wives. In Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972), the Court did
not reach a sex discrimination claim in selection of grand jurors, despite Justice
Douglas' urging that the issue be decided.
63. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973); accord San Antonio Ind.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 106-07 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
64. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 691-92 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in
judgment).
65. Id. at 691 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment).
66. Id. at 684-85.
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origin, which are clearly established as suspect classifications by firm
precedents.6 7 Thus, he concluded that pervasive sex discrimination
which politically, socially and economically discriminates against women
entitles them to the Court's utmost protection. 68
Since the statute at issue in Frontiero is a federal one, Justice Brennan took cognizance of the Court's past deferential attitude toward
Congressional judgments. 69 Thus, he attempted to strengthen his position by finding that Congress' more recent efforts, such as the proposal
of the Equal Rights Amendment, indicate that it considers discrimination based on sex invidious. Justice Brennan apparently wished to
avoid making the Court appear as a "super legislature."7 0

Justice Powell was also concerned with the Court's apparent interference in legislative affairs. He was critical of Justice Brennan's
stance in interjecting the Court in what he considers legislative matters. Justice Powell did not believe it proper that the Court decide
whether the strictest standard of review accorded to suspect classifications should apply, since this is the matter at issue in the Equal
71
Rights Amendment currently being debated in the state legislatures.
Justice Powell's reasoning is support for the view that the Equal Rights
Amendment is necessary to eliminate sex discrimination in law, since
the Court is sensitive about moving too aggressively in "frontier
areas" of the law without the ideological support of the country and its
institutions."
Therefore, rather than indicating the standard of re67. Id. at 686. See Comment, Are Sex-Based Classifications Constitutionally
Suspect?, 66 Nw. U.L REv. 481, 495-501 (1971), for discussion of sex as a classification based on status; See also Sail'er Inn Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d
529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971), which supports the view that classifications based
on sex should be treated as inherently suspect; cf. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1972), in which illegitimacy was considered a classification
based on status which has no relationship to a person's ability to function in society.
68.

See generally Dorsen and Ross, The Necessity of a Constitutional Amendment,

6 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 216 (1971), and Emerson, In Support of
the Equal Rights Amendment, 6 HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-Civ. LIB. L. REv. 225 (1971),
arguing that the Equal Rights Amendment is necessary to overcome the overwhelming
discrimination against women.
69. 411 U.S. at 687-88; cf. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 240 (1970) (opinion of Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.), and Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641, 648-49 (1966).
In Oregon v. Mitchell, the opinion indicated that Congress
had the right to determine legislative facts without the Court's interference, but there
was no evidence that Congress had in fact found that reducing the voting age from
21 to 18 was rational.
70. The Court has been criticized in the past for selectively imposing its values
in deciding which interests should be protected. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 661 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 30-34 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164,
177-85 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
71. 411 U.S. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).
72. Emerson, In Support of the Equal Rights Amendment, 6 HARV. CIv. RiGHTsCiv. Lim. L. REv. 225, 229 (1971).

305

Loyola University Law Journal

Vol. 5: 295

view he perceived Reed to set forth, Justice Powell decided Frontiero solely on the authority of Reed in a few terse paragraphs.7"
In order for the Court to review the dependency classification challenged in this case, the legislative objectives of the disparities in the
classifications had to be determined. Since there was no legislative
history indicating the reasons for differentiation between male and female service members within the dependency scheme, the district
court surmised the legislature's objectives from the face of the statute:
the scheme was intended to save administrative expense and manpower
by requiring only service women to prove their spouses' dependency.74
Underlying this objective was the assumption that few husbands are
economically dependent upon their service wives. 75 Accepting these
objectives for his analysis, Justice Brennan concluded that the classification was based solely on sex7 6 and that it treated similarly situated
service members dissimilarly for mere administrative convenience. 7
Justice Brennan could not find a compelling governmental interest to
justify the differentiation."8
If Justices Stewart and Powell had applied the traditional equal protection test as recited in Reed, they would have concluded that the
classification was reasonably related to the Congressional purpose of
administrative convenience. The denial of benefits to a relatively
small group of personnel, most of whom would not qualify as dependents, would result in a considerable saving of benefit payments
and allowances at very little administrative expense.7 9 Only by using
greater scrutiny to forbid the "arbitrary" choice among similarly situated
service members does it appear that the discrimination was invidious.
Thus, the result in Frontiero cannot be justified without concluding that despite their silence on the matter, Justices Stewart and Powell
used stricter judicial scrutiny than the traditional standard warranted;
therefore, the disagreement between Justices Powell and Stewart, on the
one hand, and Justice Brennan on the other is less than the language
of their opinions indicates.
73.

411 U.S. at 691-92 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).

74.

Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F. Supp. 201, 207 (M.D. Ala. 1972).

75. 411 U.S. at 688-89.
76. Id. at 688.
77. Id. at 688-90; accord, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972):
the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency."
78. 411 U.S. at 690-91.
79. An estimate of the cost of extending quarters allowances under changes
in dependency criteria to women in the Navy is approximately $1 million, to women
in the Marines, $0.5 million, and to women in the Air Force, $3.5 million annually.

Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on the Utilization of Manpower in the Military of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 92d Cong., Ist & 2d Sess. 12439, 12502-

503 (1972).

306

1974

Case Comments

THE BURGER COURT AND EQUAL PROTECTION

In order to assess the Burger Court's treatment in the area of equal
protection and to predict its future actions, Gerald Gunther examined fifteen basic equal protection cases of the 1971 term. s0 He
found that generally the Burger Court's decisions reveal continuity with
the Warren Court's new equal protection; but the decisions also show
a definite though gradual trend toward a "newer" equal protection doctrine."' A comparison of Frontiero with Gunther's observations and
predictions puts the case in the perspective of the Court's treatment of
other equal protection cases and indicates the development of the
Court's policies in the area of sex discrimination.
First, Gunther observed that the Burger Court has no inclination
to overturn the established aspects of the new equal protection, but it
refuses to expand its interventionist stance. 2 Thus the Burger Court
would not find new fundamental interests and suspect classifications in
which to apply strict scrutiny unless values were already rooted in the
Constitution. The Court's unanimous decision in Reed that it was not
considering sex-based classifications as inherently suspect suggests this
conclusion. However, Frontiero only partially supports this observation, since of the eight Justices concurring in the judgment, four
wished to extend the compelling state interest test devised by the Warren Court to sex-based classifications. This, as noted above, was a
complete departure from previous Supreme Court precedent.8 3 Notably none of the four Nixon appointees wished to invoke the compelling
state interest test. In Gunther's terms, this indicates their reluctance
to ". . . articulat[e] values not clearly rooted in the Constitution [which]
is, after all, the clearest element of the elusive 'strict construction'
theme so prominent in the selection of new appointees."' 4
The second factor which Gunther noted in previous equal protection cases was that there is discontent with the two-tier formulation
within the Court.'
However, there is no indication in Frontiero that
the Court was rejecting the rigid two-tier test. The main critic of this
80. Gunther at 11.
81. Id.
82. Gunther at 12-16; e.g., the Court continued to uphold alienage as a suspect
classification in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), and voting rights as
fundamental in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), but refused to find education
a fundamental right in San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973).
83. Note pp. 304-06 above.
84. Gunther at 13; see San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 33-34 (1973).

85. Gunther at 17-18; accord, Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 406 U.S.
164 (1972).
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test, Justice Marshall, has advocated a more flexible standard which applies a level of judicial scrutiny in proportion to the interests involved
in the particular case.8 6 But in Frontiero Justice Marshall joined
in Justice Brennan's opinion, indicating that the elimination of sex
discrimination is best served by the application of the compelling
state interest test.
The third element which Gunther observed is that in seven of
the fifteen cases examined, the Burger Court, rather than passively
reciting the traditional standard and deferring to the legislature's judgment, as did the Warren Court,'8 revitalized the traditional minimum
scrutiny test and used it as a tool to uphold equal protection claims. 88
These observations led Gunther to theorize that the Burger Court
was evolving a new moderate interventionist doctrine of its own-a
"newer" equal protection. The model which he sees developing is "[a]
means-oriented inquiry applicable to a wide range of laws, often attractive as a narrower ground avoiding Court confrontations with broader
value choices, and limited only by considerations of judicial competence."' 9 This approach would do more to assure that the legislature's classification be reasonable through an honest inquiry by the
Court into the facts and circumstances supporting it. This technique
would also permit the legislatures to achieve a wider range of objectives without the Court's interference.9 " This intermediate approach
applies a degree of judicial scrutiny which lies between that of the compelling state interest and traditional minimum scrutiny tests as formerly
applied by the Warren Court.
A means-focused equal protection standard would be used as a
technique to avoid more difficult issues of constitutional values by relying on a narrower ground of constitutional doctrine. 9 1 As Reed
demonstrated, the Court did not wish to plunge itself into broad policy
86. Instead of the two-tier test, Justice Marshall advocates a sliding scale test:
As the nexus between the specific constitutional guarantee and the nonconstitutional interest draws closer, the nonconstitutional interest becomes more
fundamental and the degree of judicial scrutiny applied when the interest is
infringed on a discriminatory basis must be adjusted accordingly.
San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 102-103 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
87. See, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, 394 U.S. 802
(1969).
88. Gunther at 18-20.
89. Id. at 24.
90. Id. at 23. See generally Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972).
91. Gunther at 26-30. See, e.g., James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972), where
Court did not reach the issue of whether the states method of recouping legal expenses
for indigents burdened the right to counsel.
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issues in a controversial area such as sex discrimination.9 2 In Frontiero the opinions of Justices Powell and Stewart support this aspect of
the Court's new doctrine by relying on a narrower ground and refusing
to discuss the broader issues of sex discrimination. 93 In contrast,
Justice Brennan was willing to decide the case on the larger social and
political policy questions involved. 94
The result in Reed did not strictly support Gunther's model. If the
Court had used the invigorated minimum scrutiny standard which
Gunther speculates is developing, it would have concluded that the
means chosen to reduce family quarrels and alleviate court dockets
bear a fair and substantial relationship to the legislature's objective.
But by describing the statute as "arbitrary" the Court appears to have
been using an even stricter scrutiny. 5 Examination of the result in
Frontiero leads to the same conclusion. Justice Brennan, of course,
used the compelling governmental interest test which requires the strictest judicial scrutiny. However, the opinions of Justices Stewart and
Powell could not have been made by applying the newer equal protection model without further sensitivity to sex-based classifications.
Thus, a proper analysis of Frontiero according to Gunther is: Did the
requirement of proof of a spouse's dependency by the servicewoman,
where no such proof was required by the serviceman, bear a rational relationship to the Congressional objectives of reducing the administrative burdens of cost and manpower? Under this test, it appears that
the classification is rational and should be permitted. The statutory
scheme only roughly attempts to give some additional benefits comparable to the need of service members with dependents.
Obviously it is more efficient for the government to require only the
spouses of servicewomen to prove dependency since women comprise approximately one percent of the total number of members
of the uniformed services. 96 Underlying this scheme is the assumption
that since few husbands would be able to qualify as dependents, few
would even apply. Therefore Congress would be able to save money
by denying additional income to a discernible majority of members of
a subgroup at a very low administrative expense.
As in Reed, it is only when sex-based classifications are considered
92.
93.
94.

Gunther at 30-33.
411 U.S. at 691-92 (Powell, J., and Stewart, J., concurring in judgment).
Id. at 682-91.

95.
96.

Gunther at 33-34.
A two per cent limit on the number of women in the Women's Army Corps

was amended in 1967 to permit the Secretary of Defense to prescribe the limit.
10 U.S.C. § 209(b) (Supp. IV, 1967). However, under regulation 32 C.F.R. 580.4

(1973)

the WAC strength is limited to two percent.
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with even greater scrutiny than Gunther's model indicates that the classification in Frontiero is impermissibly discriminatory. The apparent difference between the decisions in Reed and Frontiero and Gunther's
model is that even where a fair and substantial relation exists between
the classification and the legislative purpose, the Court is inclined to
view the classification based on sex with an even greater judicial sensitivity. The important fact to note, however, is that the Court has
failed to articulate a change in the test to be applied. Therefore the
traditional rational basis test on the face of Reed appears to remain
the Court's standard of review.
COMPARISON OF CLASSIFICATIONS IN

Reed AND Frontiero

Reed and Frontiero can be evaluated to determine if the Court is
formulating a new policy in the area of equal protection of sex-based
classifications. It is important to consider factors upon which the decisions can be differentiated in order to ascertain whether or not they
can be validly compared.
The probate statute in Reed was a state law; the provisions under
scrutiny in Frontiero were passed by Congress. As noted above, the
equal protection guarantee applicable to the federal government is not
identical with that of the states, but it is substantially the same.9 7 In
practice the Court has not differentiated between an equal protection
claim as applied to the states and one as applied to the federal government.9 8 The point should also be considered whether in practice
the Supreme Court treats Congressional judgment of the rationality of
the classification with greater deference than it treats judgments made
by the state legislatures. It does not appear that the Supreme Court
has, in fact, made such a distinction.99 Therefore, the Court's application of the equal protection standard and its consideration of the classification's rationality as ascertained by the legislature does not appear
to differ significantly between a state and a federal law.
The classification dealt with in Reed was part of a probate statute.
Presumably the Court would be hesitant to interfere with the state's
97. Note pp. 297-98 above.
98. Cf. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954): "In view of our decision
that the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public
schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser
duty on the Federal Government."

But cf. Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78,

89-90 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting), where Justice Marshall objected to using
the rationale of Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), which pertained to
state welfare benefits in a case involving federal social security laws.
99.

Compare Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),

v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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process for disposing of property at death. As the Court noted recently, the state has traditionally been given great deference in this
area. 10 However, the Court apparently will interfere with the probate
provisions if it feels that those provisions invidiously discriminate.101
In contrast, Frontiero involved a denial of fringe benefits to military personnel. The district court attempted to characterize the dependent's allowance as a mere "windfall,"'0 2 implying that the denial of
such "undeserved benefits" is not as great a deprivation as it would
be if such benefits were considered a right in themselves. 0 3 The
United States Supreme Court, however, has acknowledged that constitutional rights in an equal protection claim cannot be decided on the
basis of whether a right or privilege is being denied.104 Notwithstanding this pronouncement, the circumstances under which the dependent's allowance is given indicate that it is considered an integral
part of the service person's contract of employment, and not a mere
gratuity.'0 5 The additional benefits are given to reduce the disparity
between the salary paid to military personnel and that paid in busi10 6
ness.
The same dependency provision under scrutiny in Frontiero exists in
the social security laws: a husband or widower must prove his dependency for one-half of his support to qualify for benefits, whereas a
wife's or widow's dependency is presumed. 10 7 However, the Court has
recognized that the social security program provides a non-contractual
benefit and therefore that Congress has great leeway in authorizing
benefits.' 0 8 In Gruenwald v. Gardner,0 9 the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit recognized that differentiation on the basis of sex
in computing social security benefits is justified to "reduce disparity
between the economic and physical capabilities of a man and a woman."
100. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1971).
101. Cf. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972);
Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
102. Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F. Supp. 201, 207-08 (1972).
103. Id. at 208.

but see

104.

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969).

105.
106.

Kipping v. Kipping, 186 Tenn. 247, 209 S.W.2d 27 (1948).
The stated purpose of the medical and dental provisions is to "create and

maintain high morale." 10 U.S.C. § 1071 (1964).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1), (c)(1)(C), (e)(1) and (f)(1) (1964).

108. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960).
109. 390 F.2d 591, 592 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 982 (1968). But
cf. Bartmess v. Drewrys, U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404

U.S. 939 (1971), in which the court held that a retirement plan of a private employer
in which women were to retire at 62 and men at 65 violated Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.

See also § 1604.9 (a) and (b), 37 Fed. Reg. 6837 (1972),

where EEOC regulations prohibit "an employer to discriminate between men and
women with regard to fringe benefits," which include "medical, hospital, accident,
life insurance and retirement benefits.
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The court held that women are allowed favored treatment to compensate for the fact that they earn less as a group than men. It is only
invidious discrimination that will not be permitted. 1 ' Since the right
to social security benefits has not been considered to be comparable to
other contract rights, it cannot be analogized with the right to benefits
under the dependency provisions in Frontiero.
A more comparable situation to that of Frontiero is shown in Moritz v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue"' in which a tax deduction
provision was challenged by an unmarried man. He was denied
a deduction for expenses incurred in caring for a dependent given
to women, widowers, divorces and husbands under certain circumstances. The court held that the provision was unconstitutional on
the basis of sex since "[t]he statute did not make the challenged distinction as part of a scheme dealing with the varying burdens of dependents' care borne of taxpayers, but instead made a special discrimi' 2
nation premised on sex alone which cannot stand."
The classification in Reed did not completely bar women from becoming administrators. It was only when equally entitled men and
women competed for the same position that the statute required that the
male applicant be chosen. The dependency criteria in Frontiero were
even more discriminatory in effect, since spouses of male service members qualified for benefits, although some were in fact dependent for
more than one-half of their support and some were not. In contrast,
spouses of female service members qualified for benefits only if shown
to be dependent. Thus the effect of the statute was to bar a group of
non-dependent male spouses from ever receiving benefits whereas nondependent female spouses would always receive the benefits. In Reed,
women were not completely barred from being administrators but
relegated to an inferior position of entitlement when competing with
men. In Frontiero, women with husbands who were not actually dependent were completely denied benefits. This fact should not make
any difference in the Court's determination as to whether the discrimination is or is not invidious."'
CONCLUSION

The Frontiero decision did little to clarify the Court's equal protection policies in the area of sex discrimination. The opinions support110.
111.

112.
113.

Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971).
469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 906 (1973).

Id. at 470.
Cf. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1973),

in
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ing the judgment indicated that four Court members advocated the
strictest judicial scrutiny since they considered sex-based classifications as inherently suspect. Another four members appeared to apply
greater scrutiny than demanded by the traditional rational basis test
stated in Reed, but less than required by the compelling state interest
test.
The decisions in both Reed and Frontiero showed some support for
Gunther's theory that the Burger Court is formulating a new intermediate standard of review in equal protection cases. But Justice Brennan's opinion in Frontiero indicated that the compelling state interest
test should be applied to overcome sex discrimination. However, the
failure of a majority of the Court's members to actively voice their
standard of review will result in continued confusion in the lower
courts. "Open debate of the bases for the Court's action is essential
'
to the rationality and consistency of our decisionmaking process.""14
Furthermore, the Court's failure to announce a change in policy will
apparently continue until the final disposition of the Equal Rights
Amendment.
SUSAN VITULLO WALTERS

which the Court noted that the fact that illegitimate
from recovery under one statute and only relegated
under another workmen's compensation statute makes
tion of whether a statute is discriminatory.
114. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
shall, J., dissenting).

children were absolutely barred
to a lower status of recovery
no difference in the determina411 U.S. 1, 110 (1973)

(Mar-

